Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low levels of financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit-insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. This paper documents the extent of cross-country differences in deposit-insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.
Introduction
During the last two decades, a wave of systemic banking crises has rolled back and forth around the globe. The wave has struck developed and developing countries alike, resulting in 112 episodes of systemic crisis in 93 countries and 51 episodes of borderline crisis in 46 countries. 1 Proliferation of large-scale banking crises is disruptive and costly. Depositors lose access to their funds, good borrowers can lose access to credit and even be forced into bankruptcy, and some sound banks may be driven out of business. Would-be issuers of debt and equity instruments find that markets have dried up. And taxpayers are typically presented with a large bill for mitigating these disruptions. The full costs of these crises go beyond direct fiscal costs to include such consequences as derailed stabilization programs, growth slowdowns and increased poverty. Still, total fiscal costs incurred in the 1997 Thai and Korean crises exceeded 30 percent of GDP, and in Indonesia budgetary costs approached 50 percent of GDP.
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When a crisis spreads beyond the banking sector, it triggers a full-fledged financial crisis. The most recent example of this is Turkey where weaknesses in the banking system triggered a crisis of confidence in other domestic financial institutions and led to a large-scale flight of foreign capital and a severe currency crisis.
Both to make systemic breakdowns less likely and to limit the disruption and fiscal costs generated when they occur, in every country policymakers erect a financial safety net. A country's safety net comprises a collection of disruption-mitigating financial policies. These policies include implicit and explicit deposit insurance, lender-of-last-resort facilities at the central bank, specified procedures for investigating and resolving bank insolvencies, strategies for regulating and supervising banks, and provisions for accessing emergency assistance from multinational institutions such as the IMF.
Among safety net policies, the use of explicit deposit insurance has spread rapidly in recent years. Figure 1 shows that during the last 26 years the number of countries offering explicit deposit insurance guarantees has almost tripled. Establishing a sys tem of explicit deposit insurance guarantees has become a principal feature of policy advice on financial architecture that outside experts give to developing countries (see FolkertsLandau and Lindgren, 1997; and Garcia, 1999) . In 1994, deposit insurance was incorporated into the newly created single banking market of the European Union.
Today, most OECD countries and an increasing number of developing countries feature some form of explicit depositor protection.
It is not hard to see why explicit deposit insurance schemes appeal to policymakers. In the short run, since no immediate budgetary expenditure needs to be booked, they represent a seemingly costless solution to problems of bank runs or panics.
Besides stabilizing the financial sector, an insurance scheme offers political benefits:
protecting small depositors and improving opportunities for small banks to compete with larger institutions for deposits.
Mostly dismissed or denigrated by policymakers but long-recognized and persistently emphasized by the academics, is the fact that explicit deposit insurance has the potential to increase bank risk-taking. Because it reduces the incentive of depositors to monitor banks, deposit insurance can encourage excessive risk-taking -i.e., create moral ha zard, and reward imprudent banking practices. But perhaps one of the most persuasive arguments in favor of establishing explicit deposit insurance is that it can be presented as a way to limit the government's commitment to depositors. Lacking coverage limits built into an explicit insurance system, depositors may expect to exert enough political pressure to force taxpayers to supply unlimited deposit guarantees ex post. Such expectations generate moral hazard too.
The U.S. was the first country to introduce a national deposit insurance system.
Its goal was to restore confidence in the liquidity of bank deposits rather than to protect small depositors (Golembe, 1960) . Indeed, other means of protecting small depositors had long been recognized. For example, in Europe, savings banks maintained liquidity by investing in safe instruments. After decades of debate and largely adverse experience with moral hazard in state-level schemes, federal deposit insurance was enacted in 1933, in the midst of a banking crisis. For the first four decades after its establishment, the absence of failures among large institutions fostered the illusion that deposit insurance is a low cost way of preventing banking crises. But the ripening of the Savings and Loan insurance mess in the 1980s dispelled this illusion, revealing how substantially deposit insurance had exposed taxpayers to loss from risk-taking at insured institutions.
Modern theorists view deposit insurance design as a multiparty principal-agent contracting problem (Kane, 1995; Calomiris, 1996) . Contracting parties consist of banks, depositors, supervisors, politicians, and taxpayers. Events that generate losses for insured institutions obligate taxpayers to supply risk capital only when weaknesses in supervisory efforts at loss control allow an institution's losses to surpass the value of its stockholdercontributed net worth. To reduce the chances of future taxpayer losses, authorities in developed countries have since agreed to impose risk-based capital standards and to recalibrate these standards when and as regulation-induced innovation undermines their effectiveness. In the U.S., The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Improvement Act of 1991 goes even further, imposing on U.S. regulators a duty to act promptly to resolve violations of capital standards. In 1993, Congress offered U.S. taxpayers additional protection by passing the Depositor Preference Act, which in future bank liquidations subordinates the claims of non-deposit creditors to those of the FDIC.
Whether to adopt an explicit deposit insurance system and how to design it depend on the financial and supervisory environment in which it must function. Given the potential trade-off between stability and moral hazard, empirical guidance from crosscountry experience promises to be very useful. Figure 1 indicates that the policymakers are moving ahead at an alarming rate. All too often experts that recommend deposit insurance either assume countries have an appropriate institutional infrastructure or ignore the impact of imperfections in their contracting environments.
Expert advice needs to be grounded in carefully interpreted cross-country empirical evidence. However, an empirical database on which to test policy advice was slow to emerge. A recent World Bank research project developed such a database for researchers worldwide and answered questions about how explicit deposit insurance affects financial stability, how markets discipline bank risk-taking, and the development of the overall financial system. The purpose of this paper is twofold: to challenge the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt deposit insurance without first remedying observable weaknesses in their institutional environment and to buttress this challenge by reviewing cross-country 3 See Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Edward J. Kane, March 1998 , "Deposit Insurance: Issues of Principle, Design and Implementation," A World Bank Research Proposal. The data set and the papers of the research project are available on the project website: http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/confs/upcoming/deposit_insurance/home.htm empirical evidence on the effects of deposit insurance. The next section characterizes the data set and uses it to summarize the extent of cross-country differences in deposit insurance design. Section 3 explains why cross-country differences in design are appropriate and that differences in the informational and contracting environments of individual countries are bound to affect the optimal design. Section 4 summarizes empirical evidence on the impact of deposit insurance. Section 5 develops policy implications. Table 1 documents the many ways in which deposit-insurance design varies across countries. 4 An optimal worldwide blueprint is not likely to be found. For example, account coverage varies from unlimited guarantees to tight coverage limits. On the one hand, Mexico, Turkey and Japan promise 100 percent depositor coverage.
Deposit Insurance Around the World
However, countries like Chile, Switzerland, and U.K. cover only an amount of deposits that is actually less tha n their per capita GDP. Also, although many countries cover deposits denominated in foreign currency, most schemes exclude interbank deposits.
Besides setting a maximum level of coverage, some countries insist that accountholders "coinsure" a proportion of their deposit balances. Coinsurance provisions are still relatively rare, but are more frequent in recently adopted schemes.
Deposit insurance obligations are typically advance-funded, most commonly from a mixture of government and bank sources. To allow the insurer to build and maintain an appropriate fund of reserves against its loss exposures, in such countries banks are generally assessed an annual premium that is based entirely or in large part on the amount of their insured deposits. Efforts to make these annual premiums sensitive to bank risk exposure have begun in recent years.
Insurance schemes are typically managed in a government agency or in a publicprivate partnership. However, a few countries, such as Switzerland, Germany and Argentina, manage their schemes privately. Finally, in almost all countries, membership is compulsory for chartered banks. The most notable exception is Switzerland. Around the globe, large differences exist in each of these contracting features. Across countries and cultures, proxies for transparency, deterrency and accountability tend to increase with per capita GDP (Kane, 2000) , but other elements of social capital play a role as well.
Safety nets seek to prevent social costs of financial disruption and government intervention from exceeding the social benefits of damage mitigation. Safety-net design --and deposit insurance arrangements in particular--must address the particular weaknesses that exist in the institutional environment of individual countries. Recognizing that contracting environments tend to become more diverse as per capita income falls has two consequences. First, it implies that recommending a single combination of "best-practice" design features may generate counterproductive consequences in many developing countries. Second, for countries in which transparency, deterrency and accountability are very weak, implementing an efficient explicit deposit insurance scheme may simply be impossible.
Three central dimensions of every country's deposit-insurance system are: the extent to which it relies on private management and/or private funding; the breadth of its formal and informal coverages; and its susceptibility to hidden risk-shifting by insolvent banks. In moving to a system of explicit guarantees, conscientious government officials must adopt coverage, funding, and managerial structures that efficiently mitigate the particular weaknesses in transparency, deterrency, and accountability that left their country vulnerable to financial crises in the past.
The harder it has been for depositors to observe the economic value of bank capital and the character of bank risk-taking, the more important it becomes for regulators to establish informative protocols for reporting the performance and financial condition of insured banks. If the country's system of corporate governance previously gave depositors few protections against risk shifting, officials must enact special deterrent rights for the insurer. Finally, the less accountability the political system imposes on public officials generally, the more accountable deposit-insurance managers must be for accurately measuring the incremental social value their activities produce.
Historically, in environments that combine low transparency with low deterrency, it has made sense to extend stockholder liability for bank losses beyond the amount of paid-in capital in closely held banks (Kane and Wilson, 2001) and to make large depositors and substantial nondeposit creditors effectively coinsure bank losses. In lowaccountability environments, deposit-insurance managers need contractual incentives to optimize the degree of transparency and deterrency that they, minority shareholders, and coinsuring depositors receive. In environments that are low in accountability and transparency, private participation in funding and management can help to create the incentives needed to discipline safety-net loss exposures. To the extent that insurer performance can be measured meaningfully, it is useful to establish a fund of deferred compensation for top managers with the payoffs tied to appropriate measures of depositinsurance performance during their particular term in office.
As transparency, deterrency, and accountability evolve through time, so should the design features of a country's safety net. To maintain efficiency over time, the system must respond to fluctuations in private and government regulators' capacity for valuing institutions, for disciplining risk-taking and resolving insolvencies promptly, and for being appropriately rewarded or chastised for how well they perform these tasks.
Kane (2000) also discusses the dangers of using blanket deposit guarantees as a way of dealing with banking crises. In managing a crisis, the urgency of stopping a panic must not be allowed to over-ride the need to identify hopelessly insolvent institutions and cut off their opportunities to expand their risk-taking. To end a panic efficiently, liquidity must be offered only to potentially solvent institutions.
Indiscriminately issuing government guarantees and other forms of bailout support rewards bad bankers and penalizes good ones. Because such a policy perverts market discipline and risk-taking incentives and imposes unbooked obligations on the national treasury, it promises new and deeper crises in years to come.
Deposit Insurance: Theory and Empirical Evidence
An extensive theoretical literature analyzes the benefits and costs of deposit insurance and explores the challenge of balancing these benefits and costs to produce an optimal deposit-insurance system. This literature has been summarized by Kane (2000) , Calomiris (1996) , and others.
However, cross-country empirical evidence on the efficiency of real-world deposit-insurance systems has been harder to come by. We begin this section by posing four empirical questions whose answers indicate how effective an individual country's deposit-insurance system happens to be. The four questions are:
• How does deposit insurance affect bank stability?
• How does deposit insurance affect market discipline?
• How does deposit insurance impact financial development?
• What role does deposit insurance play in managing crises?
We go on to identify pertinent literature bearing on each question and to review empirical evidence on how the answer to each question varies across different countries and contracting environments.
How does explicit deposit insurance affect bank stability?
In the midst of a systemic crisis, expanding or firming up depositor guarantees has great appeal to policymakers as a crisis-mitigating device. However, the deferred costs of treating a crisis myopically can be substantial. The best long-run way to incorporate deposit insurance into a country's safety net is a matter of controversy among economists.
A classic paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) frames deposit insurance as an optimal policy in a contracting environment where limited transparency allows bank stability to be threatened by self-fulfilling depositor runs and runs on solvent banks are depositors' only deterrent instrument for reducing their loss exposure. In Allen and Gale (1998) , greater transparency allows runs to be triggered only by an actual deterioration in bank asset quality. In this higher-transparency environment, the optimal safety-net strategy is to use central-bank loans to supply liquidity to the banking system.
Precisely because safety nets are so effective in arresting runs, safety nets generate moral hazard. This moral hazard comes both from banks and their regulators.
Opportunistic bankers can exploit weaknesses in supervisory transparency and deterrency by taking inefficient risks and even engaging in fraudulent activity. In practice, regulators and politicians who control the supervisory elements of the safety net often have insufficient incentive to monitor and enforce prudential regulations. Kane (1989) shows that regulatory activity encouraged risk-taking by insured thrift institutions during the U.S. S&L debacle.
Incentives for risk-shifting and looting by banks decline with bank capital and with transparency, deterrency, and accountability. Transparency and bank capital tend to decline in the face of adverse economic shocks (Merton, 1977 and Calomiris, 1990) .
Looting often takes the form of bankers making loans to themselves or related parties at below-market terms. As a bank's capital becomes exhausted, the costs of corrupt lending fall more and more on the safety net (Akerlof and Romer, 1993) .
Economic theory offers a mixed message. On the one hand, credible deposit insurance contributes to financial stability by making depositor runs less likely. On the other hand, unless insured institutions' capital positions and risk-taking are supervised carefully, the insurer will accrue loss exposures that undermine bank stability in the long run. Because deposit-insurance theory embraces good and bad outcomes, it is critical to explore empirical evidence. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) are the first to use the cross-county database to study the link between deposit insurance and financial crises. They use data from 61 countries for the period 1980-1997 to estimate a model of banking crisis. After controlling for other determinants, they find that the presence of poorly designed explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the likelihood that a country will experience a banking crisis and that this result does not appear to be driven by reverse causality.
Recognizing that the design of explicit deposit insurance varies significantly across countries, Demirgüç -Kunt and Detragiache (DKD) focus on whether and how individual design features mitigate the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability. The regressio n experiment reproduced in Table 2 shows that deposit insurance causes the most trouble in countries where coverage is extensive, where authorities amass a large fund of explicit reserves and earmark it for insolvency resolution, and where the scheme is administered by government officials rather than the private sector. These findings underscore the importance of confronting squarely the moral hazard that deposit insurance threatens to generate. DKD also show that the contribution of deposit insurance to bank fragility is significant in countries where the institutional environment lacks transparency and deterrency, but is not significant in countries whose environment is strong. These findings support the hypothesis that where the contracting environment controls incentive conflict, effective prudential regulation and supervision can offset the adverse incentives created by deposit insurance so that moral hazard need not be worrisome.
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) find that DKD's deposit insurance evidence is not robust to the twin effects of omitting developed countries from their sample and employing a single-dimensional dummy variable to capture the existence of explicit deposit insurance. This finding is not truly inconsistent with DKD whose results are significant when they incorporate deposit insurance design features and institutional characteristics into their analysis. On average, the more a system embraces features that intensify moral hazard, the more vulnerable it is to banking crisis. Policymakers should view the positive correlation between explicit deposit insurance and banking crises as a wakeup call. Credible deposit insurance allows banks to gather deposits regardless of the risks they take. We would expect a positive correlation if deposit insurance greatly reduces monitoring by private parties and replaces it by ineffective regulatory and supervisory discipline. In countries with strong institutions, we would expect most or all of this reduction in depositor monitoring to be compensated by official monitoring, so that the impact of deposit insurance on bank fragility would not prove significant. But is there any direct evidence of the impact of deposit insurance on market discipline? We turn to this issue next.
How does deposit insurance affect market discipline?
In high-transparency environments, depositors can discipline banks that engage in excessive risk-taking by demanding higher deposit interest rates or by withdrawing their deposits. However, to the extent that deposit insurance reduces the stake that depositors have in monitoring and policing bank capital and loss exposures, it shifts responsibility for controlling bank risk-taking to the regulatory system. Wherever deposit-insurance managers displace more discipline than they exert, bank performance is undermined. To understand this, we must investigate two questions:
• How do depositors exert market discipline?
• How does deposit insurance lessen depositor discipline?
Evidence on market discipline as reflected in bank interest cost comes primarily from U.S. experience. Flannery (1998) surveys research on how the interest cost of uninsured bank deposits and other debt instruments in the U.S. responds to observable measures of default risk. In the U.S., balances in excess of $100,000 are not insured.
Typically, researchers find that interest rates paid on these partially insured instruments (certificates of deposits, CDs) increase significantly with bank riskiness (Baer and Brewer 1986 , Hannan and Hanweck 1988 , and Brewer and Mondschean 1994 . Linking movements in CD rates to bank-specific news embedded in movements in stock prices, Ellis and Flannery (1992) show that bank CD rates respond generally to market perceptions of bank-specific risks.
Cook and Spellman (1994) Moving beyond depositor reactions, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) study market yield spreads between uninsured bank debentures and callable treasury bonds. These spreads showed significant sensitivity to bank risk during the years 1989-1991 when the mess was being cleaned up. This was also a time when doubts were emerging about whether the FDIC could or would fully rescue creditors of insolvent bank holding companies. The importance of variation in the credibility of implicit and explicit guarantees is supported in a negative way by the behavior of spreads on bank derivatives in the less stressful era of [1983] [1984] . Analyzing data from that era, Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) and Gorton and Santomero (1990) failed to uncover any risk sensitivity.
Apparently, interest costs on insured deposits and uninsured instruments discipline depository institutions ever more strongly when doubts arise about the insurer's ability to cover its guarantees. Such doubts are endemic to developing countries and can accelerate quickly.
Evidence on whether the deposit growth of banks is retarded by default risk premiums is available from a wide spectrum of countries and time periods. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) explain why we should expect deposit growth to slow at a troubled institution. Statistical analysis uncovers similar patterns around the world. Martinez- Peria and Schmukler (1998) , find that deposits at banks in Argentina, Chile and Mexico respond negatively to risk measures generated from accounting data. They also show that in Chile, where deposit insurance appeared most credible, uninsured depositors were effective monitors of bank risk.
Examining a sample of New York City banks in the 1920s and 1930s, Calomiris
and Wilson (1998) show that depositors successfully discriminated among banks on the basis of their riskiness and tended to shift funds to safer havens. Similarly, Kane (1987) reports that when the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund (ODGF) fell into crisis in 1985, Ohio depositors removed funds only from ODGF-insured institutions. Park (1995) and Park and Peristiani (1998) show that, during the 1980s, deposit growth at individual U.S.
thrifts was negatively related to their estimated probability of default, so that riskier thrifts experienced smaller deposit growth.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (DKH, 2000) build a bank-level dataset covering
43 countries over 1990-1997, and study both dimensions of depositor discipline by looking at interest rates and deposit growth. The evidence shows that explicit insurance lowers banks' interest expenses and makes interest payments less sensitive to bank risk and liquidity. However, regardless of the character of a country's safety net, some market discipline survives. Consistent with the U.S. evidence on interest sensitivity, the market discipline DKH can observe responds to gaps in coverage, weaknesses in the credibility of the guarantees, and delays and other costs entailed in recovering funds from the guarantor.
DKH particularly focus on how variation in design characteristics affect market discipline. They find that market discipline is stronger in countries with higher levels of institutional development. Nevertheless, even in countries whose institutional development is strong, badly designed deposit insurance curtails market discipline.
Setting higher coverage limits, extending coverage to interbank deposits, establishing an ex-ante fund of reserves, funding reserves from government sources, and insisting on public management each displaces market discipline. On the other hand, market discipline is enhanced by coinsurance provisions, covering foreign currency deposits, and establishing private or joint management of the insurance enterprise.
The value deposit insurance offers banks and their creditors can be measured by the reduction it creates in required interest rates. Society pays for increases in the perceived safety of deposits by accepting the administrative costs of supervising banks and the consequences of any net reduction in market discipline. "Correct" pricing through insurance premia could in principle eliminate risk shifting, but such pricing is politically and administratively difficult, especially in developing countries. Leaven Such individual-bank data provide direct evidence of the way in which deposit insurance design can affect bank risk-taking incentives. Although deposit insurance displaces market discipline even in advanced countries, the net effect may be improved by strong regulation and supervision. These findings reinforce the evidence on deposit insurance and bank ing crises. Countries with poor contracting environments are most likely to suffer adverse consequences from deposit insurance.
Some argue that in institutionally underdeveloped countries explicit deposit insurance may have other advantages that offset its negative effects on market discipline and systemic stability. Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren (1998) maintain that the principal benefit of deposit insurance is to provide a risk-free asset to small savers. Critics of this view point out that this benefit may be obtained without destabilization costs by issuing assets such as postal savings or money market funds backed by government debt (Calomiris, 1996 , Stiglitz, 1992 , or by insisting that banks issuing insured deposits could be constrained to remain "narrow" banks. A second and specifically evolutionary view maintains that in countries with underdeveloped institutions, deposit insurance may be expected to create a launching pad for improving the banking system so that it performs financial intermediation more efficiently. We examine empirical evidence on this hypothesis in the next section.
How Does Deposit Insurance Impact Financial Development?
Countries adopt deposit insurance for different reasons. However, a common reason is to increase the flow of bank credit by increasing the confidence that the general public has in the formal banking system without having to explicitly raise or expend current fiscal resources. To the extent that deposit insurance bolsters depositors' faith in the stability of the banking system, it may mobilize household savings for use by the financial system. The question is whether or not the funds mobilized go on to support improved patterns of investment and sustainably higher aggregate economic growth.
Recent adopters of deposit insurance have included African and Latin American
countries with low levels of financial development. To investigate whether and how explicit deposit insurance contributes to financial development, Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2000) examine time-series data for 58 countries. These authors find that explicit deposit insurance favorably impacts the level of financial activity and its volatility only in the presence of strong institutional development. If deposit-insurance arrangements do not include a regulatory scheme that can overcome weaknesses in the institutional environment, instability is fostered and subsequent financial development is harmed.
Examining a cross section of 49 countries, Cecchetti and Krause (2000) show that deposit insurance retards the evolution of nonbank financing mechanisms. Countries with more extensive bank deposit insurance tend to have smaller capital and financial markets and a lower number of publicly traded firms per capita.
Thus, in institutionally weak environments, deposit insurance appears to retard rather than to foster financial development. Cross-country research underscores the longrun danger facing countries that adopt explicit deposit insurance without stopping to repair demonstrable inadequacies in their contracting environments. This evidence amounts to a caution flag for authorities considering whether to adopt deposit insurance.
Their decision making process should begin with an audit of the degree of transparency, deterrency, and accountability present in their institutional framework. Good safety-net design does not consist of merely copying what works in developed countries. Good design adapts itself to the need to mitigate problems specific to a country's framework for financial contracting. Officials often act as if institutional audits and country-specific adaptations may be set aside in times of crisis. According to this view, countries whose creditors pressure them to adopt deposit insurance in the midst of a financial crisis ha ve little opportunity to think about longer-term consequences. It is fair to ask whether provision of blanket deposit insurance is of much help in managing crises. Again, we turn to empirical evidence.
What Role Does Deposit Insurance Play in Managing Crises?
It is common practice to issue blanket guarantees to arrest a banking crisis.
Countries adopting this strategy include Sweden (1992) , Japan (1996 ), Thailand (1997 , Korea (1997) , Malaysia (1998), and Indonesia (1998) . More recently, Turkey tried to halt its financial panic by guaranteeing not just bank depositors, but all domestic and foreign nondeposit creditors of Turkish banks.
Advocates of using blanket guarantees to halt a systemic crisis argue that sweeping guarantees can be helpful, even essential, in halting depositors' flight to quality. However, because blanket guarantees create an expectation of their future use in similar circumstances, they undermine market discipline and may prove greatly destabilizing over longer periods. Although some countries have managed to scale back formal insurance coverage once a crisis has receded, it is very difficult to scale back informal coverage in a credible manner.
It is clear that a policy of credibly extending blanket guarantees is sufficient to stop a depositor run. However, for governments in developing countries, establishing and subsequently maintaining the credibility of its guarantees is a costly matter.
Extensive government guarantees shift accrued losses and loss exposures from bank stakeho lders to taxpayers. The fiscal cost of making good on blanket guarantees is an implicit government expenditure that generates an equal amount of implicit government debt. This unbooked spending and unbooked debt subtly undermine the country's foreign-exc hange reserves. Hence, in countries whose fiscal capacity is weak, financially sophisticated parties face continuing incentives to move wealth offshore. If this capital flight begins soon enough, blanket guarantees may not work even in the short run without extensive outside support.
Even if successful in stopping an immediate crisis, introducing guarantees to stop a crisis creates the expectation of similar bailouts in future crises. The more frequently this remedy is used and the more enthusiastically it is approved by foreign and multinational institutions, the harder it becomes for banks and their creditors to take seriously post-crisis attempts to roll formal coverages back to less-disruptive levels. Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) analyze the impact of blanket guarantees and other crisismanagement strategies on the ultimate fiscal cost of resolving banking-system distress.
Data covering forty crises around the world indicate that unlimited depositor guarantees,
open-ended liquidity support, and regulatory forbearance significantly increase the ultimate fiscal cost of resolving a banking crisis. Moreover, these authors find no tradeoff between fiscal costs and the speed of economic recovery. In their sample, depositor guarantees and regulatory forbearance failed to significantly reduce either crisis duration or the crisis-induced decline in aggregate real output. Providing liquidity support for insolvent institutions appears to prolong a crisis by destabilizing bank-lending incentives so extensively that healthy adjustments are delayed and additional output loss is generated.
Even in the midst of a crisis, it is inefficient to sacrifice long-term goals to resolve immediate pressures. Efficient crisis management begins with triage. Hopelessly insolvent institutions must be identified and their risk-taking brought under control.
Providing open-ended liquidity support to moribund institutions and extending blanket guarantees to their creditors is apt to spawn new and more-virulent crises down the line.
Even when conceived entirely as a temporary emergency measure, blanket depositinsurance guarantees engender high fiscal costs. Incurring these costs is unlikely to help the real economy to recover faster from banking crisis or to experience a smaller output loss.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The empirical research reviewed here answers two main questions:
• Whether some countries would do well to avoid explicit deposit insurance all together?
• How should deposit-insurance design respond to cross-country differences in transparency, deterrency, and accountability?
Should every country adopt explicit deposit insurance?
Cross-country empirical research on deposit insurance strongly supports the hypothesis that in institutionally weak environments, poorly designed deposit-insurance arrangements tend to increase the probability of future banking crises. This finding is statistically robust, in that it emerges using different data sets and two very different research protocols. When researchers compare the incidence of observed banking crises in different countries around the world, countries with poorly designed explicit depositinsurance systems are found to experience more crises. Moreover, the frequency of these crises is worse in countries that have weak contracting environments. When researchers focus instead on bank-level interest costs and deposit growth in different countries, net private and government monitoring of banks proves decisively weaker in poorly designed systems.
The most plausible interpretation of these results is that governments should address weaknesses in their transparency, deterrency, and accountability before adopting explicit deposit insurance schemes. Improving banking regulation and supervision, reforming the legal system such that property rights are protected and contract enforcement is strengthened, upgrading accounting and disclosure rules so that accurate information reaches the markets in a timely fashion exemplify the kinds of institutional reforms that improve incentive structures and limit excess risk-taking.
In poor contracting environments, risk-shifting is magnified because insuranceinduced reductions in private monitoring are intensified by deficiencies in the nature of official monitoring. Banks are tempted to exploit monitoring weakness by issuing insured deposits and using them to finance projects with substantial downside risks. As the expanding value of unbooked guarantees subtly exhausts the fiscal capacity of the government, the fragility of a country's financial system increases. Although government officials have often been led to believe that deposit insurance helps to develop a robust financial system, it cannot do this unless the contracting environment can support it.
Poor supervision leads banks to lend on positively skewed, but negative present-value projects. Such lending undermines bank solvency, destroys real economic capital, and deters financial development.
Cross-country empirical research verifies the importance of a nation's financialcontracting environment. A country must prepare itself to support explicit deposit insurance in an efficient manner. Governments that are thinking of adopting deposit insurance must recognize that a strong contracting environment is a precondition. Indeed, if a country's contracting environment is not characterized by a reasonable degree of transparency, accountability and deterrency, an explicit deposit insurance scheme is likely to do more harm than good. For countries with weak institutions, adopting explicit deposit insurance promises at best to assist financial development only in the very short run. Over longer periods, it is likely to undermine market discipline, aggravate moral hazard and intensify financial fragility. This policy conclusion is distressingly relevant because many of the countries recently adopting explicit deposit insurance have a demonstrably poor contracting environment.
How should explicit deposit insurance be designed?
Cross-country empirical research offers lessons for countries that have installed or are in the process of adopting explicit deposit-insurance schemes. Even in favorable circumstances, using explicit deposit insurance to increase depositor confidence threatens to heighten financial fragility by reducing the degree of market discipline that banks experience. However, appropriate design features can both control and offset these effects to minimize social costs.
Empirical research supports the hypothesis that the following features enhance market discipline and reduce moral hazard:
• Credibly low coverage limits per account
• Narrow coverage (e.g., excluding interbank deposits)
• Coinsurance (and alternative private loss-sharing arrangements such as subordinated debt and extended stockholder liability) • Compulsory membership The preference for ex-post funding and private involvement in insurance design and management is inevitably a harder sell. On the one hand, not having immediate access to a pool of accumulated liquid reserves threatens to delay authorities from dealing with insolvent institutions in a timely manner. However, cross-country evidence indicates that in weak institutional environments the net economic value of depositinsurance reserves is routinely overstated by failing to account for the implicit liabilities that weak and insolvent clients implicitly shift onto these reserves. Indeed, an overvalued fund tends to intensify moral hazard by leading depositors and competing institutions to ignore evidence of individual bank insolvencies.
Even if left unfunded, a country's deposit-insurance scheme could still be given immediate access to a credit line either from its national treasury or from reinsurance contracts written with reliable outside insurers. In weak contracting environments, it is useful to assign additional decision-making units, such as the treasury or foreign reinsurers, meaningful responsibility for overseeing design and management decisions.
Irrespective of whether net deposit-insurance losses are funded ex ante or ex post, it must be made clear that funds to cover losses will come principally from surviving banks.
Otherwise, government backup threatens to reduce market discipline and increase fragility.
Empirical evidence also indicates that involving private parties in managing deposit-insurance arrangements reduces moral hazard and fragility. While private managers can also shirk their duties and even misappropriate funds, stakeholders in any private scheme have strong incentives to monitor and police managerial actions.
Finally, the importance of the research summarized here is to focus attention on the need to identify institutional prerequisites for adopting deposit insurance and to make a concerted effort to get system's design right. Cross-country research does not show that deposit insurance is universally a mistake or that all countries with explicit systems should abandon their scheme at the first opportunity. In countries where the contracting environment is well developed, systemic problems are rare and correlations between design features and crises are weaker and often insignificant. 
